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REGULATION OF FINANCE CHARGES ON
CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT
Robert W. Johnson*
subject of adequate disclosure of finance charges in consumer
credit transactions has, in recent years, "become a rallying point
for consumers and a battle line for industry." 1 Equal heat is generated by discussions concerning the regulation of finance charges on
consumer instalment credit. The aim of this article is to examine
briefly the existing pattern of rate regulation and then to explore the
purposes of ceilings on consumer finance charges and the problems
involved in their design. As is true with the question of disclosure of
finance charges, the problems are extremely complex. Men of good
will on both sides of the argument will disagree, but if the economic
rationale is clearly understood, the philosophical grounds for disagreement may become more sharply defined. 2

T

I.

HE

EXISTING RATE CEILINGS ON CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT

Those states with the most comprehensive schemes for regulation
of consumer credit set different maximum rates for each recognized
form of instalment credit. The types of instalment credit can be
divided into ·two general categories with much diversity within
each category: (I) instalment loans by pawnbrokers, licensed lenders,
credit unions, industrial loan companies, savings and loan associations, and commercial banks-as well as certain revolving cash
credit plans; (2) instalment sales of various consumer goods, particularly new and used automobiles-as well as revolving sales credit
• Professor of Industrial Administration, Krannert Graduate School of Industrial
Administration, Purdue University. 1939-1942, Oberlin College; M.B.A. 1946, Harvard
Business School; Ph.D. 1957, Northwestern University. The author has served since
1964- as Associate Reporter-Economist and as Economic Consultant to the Consumer
Credit Project of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
The opinions expressed in this article are his own and are not intended to reflect the
views of the National Conference or of the Special Committee on Retail Installment
Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury.-Ed.
I. Jordan &: ·warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 l\:IICH. L. REv.
1285-322 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Jordan &: Warren].
2. To clarify my aims in this article, the objective is to discuss whether limitation
on consumer finance charges is desirable, and, if so, what principles might guide the
formulation of rate ceilings. Certain associated problems are not covered. Among
these are the form in which any rate ceiling should be stated in legislation, the legal
problems of applying state legislation to federally chartered credit grantors, the definition of a consumer credit transaction, the limitation of charges for delinquency, or
for extending or refinancing outstanding debts, and limitations on finance charges in
lease transactions that serve as alternatives to consumer instalment sales.
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plans.3 It is perhaps not too much to say that the irreconcilable diversity of rate ceilings governing the major types of consumer instalment
credit today may, in itself, help to justify the move toward greater
uniformity in legislation governing consumer credit.

A. Cash Credit
I. Small Loan Transactions

Under the leadership of the Russell Sage Foundation, the
Uniform Small Loan law (U.S.L.L.) was conceived and drafted in
1916 to meet the problem of loan sharks-illegal lenders who extract
usurious interest rates from the public-by excepting small loans
from the prohibitions of the usury laws. Such an exception was necessary because it was not economically possible for commercial lenders
to provide instalment loans to consumers at the rates specified in the
general interest and usury laws; thus, a vacuum was created in the
loan market which loan sharks rushed to fill. Under the U.S.L.L.,
lenders licensed by the state were permitted to charge higher, or
augmented, rates on loans below a given amount on the condition
that they adhered to various stringent regulations designed to prevent
abuse of borrowers. 4 Today, all of the states except Arkansas and the
District of Columbia "have laws which permit cash lending by finance
companies at rates which would attract responsible capital." 5 The
majority of these laws are patterned after the U.S.L.L., and most
specify a rate ceiling that declines as the amount of credit granted
increases. 6
3. A good summary description of various consumer credit institutions may be found
in M. NEIFELD, MANUAL ON CONSUMER CREDIT 311-464 (1961).
4. See generally, D. GALLERT, W. HILBORN 8: G. MAY, SMALL LOAN u:G!Sl.ATION
(1932); F. HUBACHEK, ANNOTATIONS ON SMALL LOAN LAws (1938); L. ROBINSON 8: R.
NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SMALL LOAN BUSINESS (1935).
5. NATIONAL CONSUMER Ass'N, 1967 FINANCE FACTS YEARBOOK 51.
6. Section 13(a) of the Seventh Draft of the UNIFORM SMALL LOAN LAW (U.S.L.L.)
(1942) provides:
Every licensee hereunder may contract for and receive, on any loan of money not
exceeding $300 in amount, charges at a rate not exceeding 3 per cent a month
on that part of the unpaid principal balance of any loan not in excess of $100,
and 2 per cent a month on any remainder of such unpaid principal balance.
R. BARRETT, COMPILATION OF CONSUMER FINANCE LAws 681 (1952). As some states raised
the size of loan ceiling under the U.S.L.L., there has been a tendency to more gradations
in the rate ceiling. For example, in Iowa licensed lenders are permitted to levy a
monthly charge of 3% on the first $150 of declining outstanding principal balance, 2%
on the unpaid balance from $150.01 to $300; 1½% on the balance from $300.01 to
$700; and 1% on the balance above $700 to the ceiling of $1,000. As noted in Jordan 8:
Warren 1286-89, some states permit these charges to be precomputed; that is, the
finance charge applicable over the life of the loan is calculated at the time credit is
granted on the assumption that the loan will be repaid according to the contract. To
appraise these rates, it is important to recognize that each rate applies only to the
specified portion of the unpaid monthly balance. Thus, as a loan for $1,000 is repaid
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The maximum finance charge permitted licensed lenders varies
greatly among the states. For example, on a $500 cash advance repayable in twelve monthly instalments, Alaska permits a finance charge
of $129.76, while New York limits the charge to $64.72. The median
charge among the states is $81.52. 7 These dollar amounts convert into
nominal annual rates to maturity of 44.9%, 23.0%, and 28.8%
respectively. 8 Of course, under the customary graduated rate ceilings, the authorized rates would be somewhat higher on smaller
loans and lower on larger loans. In addition, a number of states
have ancillary acts under which licensed lenders may make larger
loans than permitted under the small loan law, but at rates that are
typically below the ceiling rates in the small loan statutes. 9
The Seventh Draft of the U.S.L.L. provides that "in addition to
monthly, the l % rate applies only while the outstanding balance exceeds $700, and
then only to that portion of the unpaid balance above $700. The 3, 2, and 1½% rates
apply to their respective portions of the balance below $700. Consequently, the annual
yield on loans under a graduated rate is not twelve times the simple average of the
monthly rates weighted by the portion of the loan to which they apply. To determine
the annual rate permited by the ceiling requires laborious calculations, a computer,
or rather complex formulas. For the formulas, see Stelson, Graduated Interest Rates in
Small Loans, 69 AM. MATHEMATICAL MONTIILY 15-21 (1962).
Other states have rate ceilings expressed as dollar add-on rates; that is, the ceiling
rates are based on dollars per $100 per year of the initial unpaid balance, rather
than the declining unpaid balance, as in the case of per-cent-per-month ceilings.
For example, licensed lenders in Ohio are permitted add-on rates of $16-$9-$7 per year
at $500 and $1,000 to a ceiling of $2,000. Since add-on rates apply to the initial unpaid
balance, the average add-on rate can be approximated by an average of the add-on
rates weighted by the portions of the loan to which they apply. Thus under the Ohio
rate ceiling a one-year loan for $1,500 could have an average add-on rate of $10.67
per $100 per year:

Add-on rate
$16/$100
$ 9/$100
$ 7/$100

Portion of initial principal
$500
$500
$500
$1,500

Dollar charge
$80
45
35
$160

Weighted average add-on rates: $160/$1500 == $10.67 /$rnO/year. Since small loans are
frequently refinanced, the actual yields will depend upon the methods of refunding
the unpaid portion of the finance charge and the time of refinancing.
7. The source for these figures is an unpublished 1967 table prepared by a major
consumer finance company.
8. The nominal annual rate is defined as twelve times the monthly rate. This is
the most common method of converting a monthly rate to an annual rate. However,
some argue that a monthly rate should be compounded monthly to determine the
annual rate. The former procedure is advocated by M. NEIFELD, GUIDE TO INSTALMENT
COMPUTATIONS 146, 315-20 (1953). The latter procedure is supported by M. AYRES, INSTALMENT MATHEMATICS HANDBOOK 212-14, 233-35 (1946), and at one time was sanctioned by the FEDERAL TRADE Co:MMISSION, REPORT ON MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 955-56
(1939). One per cent per month compounded monthly would equal 12.68 per cent per
annum.
9. E.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 22000-653 (West 1955); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 11, §§ 163-203
(1957).
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the charges herein provided for, no further or other amount whatsoever shall be directly or indirectly charged, contracted for, or
received." 10 All states, save two, 11 have made exceptions to this principle in enacting their own small loan laws; the most common exceptions are various filing and recording fees, delinquency and deferral
charges-especially when finance charges have been precomputedand various forms of credit insurance. 12 Some states also authorize,
within limits, certain additional service charges. The effect of these
latter amendments is to raise the ceiling rate, while preserving the
inverse relationship between rate and size of loan.

2. Credit Union Loans
Credit union laws also had their origin in the early part of the
twentieth century, with the first such law being passed in Massachusetts in 1909.13 Like the small loan laws, credit union laws provided
an exception to the usury laws in order to permit operations of legal
lenders. As in many small loan statutes, rate ceilings for credit unions
are expressed as a given per cent per month on the declining monthly
unpaid balance. However, unlike most rate ceilings on small loans,
ceilings on credit union loans are usually constant, regardless of the
amount or term of the loan. Federal credit unions must limit thefr
finance charges to 1% per month-a nominal annual rate of
12%,14 With a few exceptions15 this is also the rate ceiling for statechartered credit unions.
In addition to the finance charge, federal credit unions may require the borrower to pay for the cost of releasing a mortgage or lien
on the collateral property, insuring the property against casualty loss,
and restoring clear title to the borrower.16 Some state laws also
permit specified additional charges.17
3. Industrial and Commercial Bank Loans
Industrial banks were originally established as Morris Plan banks
in 1910 to make loans to consumers against hypothecated deposits,
10. R. BARREIT, supra note 6, at 681.
11. Virginia and Wisconsin are the two states without exceptions.
12. See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 25-29 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as CURRAN). This excellent work is a convenient aid in researching existing legislation as of 1965 and will be used in this article to cite compilations of state statutes.
13. Ch. 419 [1909] Mass. Acts now MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 419.
14. Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1757 (1964). Unlike consumer finance
companies, credit unions may obtain either a federal or state charter.
15. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2006 (1966) (10% per year); w. VA. CODE ANN.
31-10-16 (1966) (1.5% per month).
16. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, &: WELFARE, CREDIT MANUAL FOR CREDIT UNIONS
39 (1964).
17. See CURRAN 49 nn.331-35.
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but now they are often difficult to distinguish from commercial banks.
The serious entry of commercial banks into the consumer credit
market is usually dated at 1928, when the National City Bank of New
York first offered cash loans to consumers, 18 although other banks had
previously done some experimenting with personal loans. The effect
of laws governing the consumer loan activities of both types of banks
has been to permit yet another exception to existing usury statutes.
Somewhat more than half the states permit industrial banks or industrial loan companies19 to make consumer cash loans, usually with rate
ceilings, and about four-fifths of the states have instalment loan laws
applicable to commercial banks.20
Rate ceilings governing cash loans made by industrial and commercial banks are such a mixed bag that it is difficult to generalize. 21
The heritage of commercial lending led to rate ceilings expressed as
discount rates. Under this procedure, banks are permitted to deduct
the finance charge from the face amount of the note at the time of
the loan. 22 In contrast to the graduated rate ceilings discussed above,
a rate ceiling expressed as a discount rate permits effective rates that
rise as maturities lengthen, 23 since the longer the term of the loan, the
greater the amount that will be pre-deducted from the face amount,
and the lesser the amount that the lender must make immediately
available to the borrower. Since long maturities are associated with
18. For a capsule recount of the growth of consumer lending by commercial banks,
see AMERICAN BANKER'S Ass'N, THE COMMERCIAL BANKING INDUSTRY 163-69 (1962).

19. There is no essential difference between an "industrial bank" and an "industrial
loan company" other than the right to use the word "bank" in the corporate name.
20. CURRAN 54-55, 68.
21. See CURRAN 52-57, 66-74, 204-19, 226-43.
22. Rate ceilings expressed as add-on or discount rates have quite different effects;
cf. note 6 supra. Add-on rate ceilings limit the amount of the finance charge that may
be added to the principal balance. If the permited add-on finance charge is $7 per $100
of initial principal balance per year, a lender may add to the principal balance of a
two-year loan for $1,000 a finance charge of $140 (S7 x 10 x 2). The total obligation
of the consumer is then $1,140 and his proceeds, $1,000.
If the rate ceiling is expressed as a discount rate, say $7 per $100 of initial principal
balance per year, discount, or 7% per year, discount, a lender can deduct the
$140 finance charge from the face of the two-year $1,000 loan, leaving the borrower
with net proceeds of only $860. Thus one difference betlveen add-on and discount
rates is that the same rate provides a higher annual yield to the credit grantor if he
is allowed to discount the finance charge, rather than add the charge to the principal.
23. As maturities lengthen, the nominal annual yield under the add-on rate ceiling
rises and then falls, where as the yield under a discount rate ceiling constantly rises.
This phenomenon is summarized in the table below showing the nominal annual rates
for various maturities under add-on and discount rate ceilings of $7 per $100 of initial
unpaid balance per year (or 7% per annum on initial unpaid balance):
Terms in Months
Add-on rate yield (%)
Discount rate yield (%)

3

6

12

24

36

48

60

10.5
10.7

11.9
12.3

12.7

12.9
14.9

12.8
16.0

12.7
17.2

12.5
18.5

13.6
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large loans, the result is a rate ceiling that increases with the size of
loan. For this reason, some rate ceilings using a discount rate are
often coupled with a limitation on maturity of loan.
The most common rate ceilings on instalment loans by industrial
and commercial banks vary from 6% to 8% per annum discounted
from the face of the note. These figures translate into an actual yield
that ranges from about 11.6% on twelve-month loans to 18.8% on
thirty-six-month loans.
Statutes regulating loans by industrial and commercial banks also
differ from those limiting rates on loans by licensed lenders and credit
unions in that they more frequently permit additional charges
for making and servicing a loan. Sometimes minimum charges are
allowed. The effect of permitting such charges is, of course, to raise
the rate ceiling on small loans. In some states the rate ceiling on small
loans with short maturities by commercial banks is higher than that
permitted licensed lenders on corresponding loans. When minimum
charges are coupled with a rate ceiling expressed as a discount rate,
the rate ceiling in relation to size of loan becomes a "lazy-]" shaped
curve, dropping quite sharply as one goes from very small to mediumsized loans, and then gradually moving upward for large loans with
long maturities.

4. Home Improvement Loans
Home improvement loans insured under title I of the National
Housing Act24 are also subject to rate ceilings. Present maximum
charges are $5 per $100 per year of unpaid principal balance on the
first $2,500 and $4 per $100 per year on the balance above $2,500.
Although the charges may be discounted, the maximum yield may
not exceed that available on twelve-month contracts. 25 The effect of
this language is to limit the available finance charge to a nominal
annual rate of just under 10% on twelve-month contracts for
less than $2,500, with slightly lower ceilings prevailing on longer
term contracts. On contracts above $2,500, the rate ceiling falls
farther below 10%, the larger the unpaid balance and the longer
the maturity. Permitted fees include recording and filing fees,
stamp taxes, title examination charges, and premiums for property
insurance, if any, required for security for the loan. 26
24. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1702-06(d) (1964).
25. 12 U.S.C. § I703(b) (1964).
26. See CURRAN 63.
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5. Check-Credit Loans
Check-credit plans are a procedure whereby an individual may
draw against a pre-established line of credit at his commercial bank
by simply writing checks. He is, of course, then obligated to commence prescribed monthly payments to reduce his debt. Since these
plans are relatively recent innovations, most are governed by the
appropriate instalment loan laws or the usury laws. The four states
which have passed legislation dealing specifically with check credit
plans27 place rate ceilings of 1% per month on the outstanding
balance (a nominal annual rate of 12%) plus a fee of 25¢ per
check. Various methods are provided for determining the outstanding
balance. The effect of the 25¢ fee is to provide a yield slightly
over 12%, but the effect is minimal except when a borrower writes
a large number of small checks.

B. Sales Credit
In contrast to cash credit, instalment sales credit was considered
immune from rate ceilings for a considerable number of years under
the time-price doctrine. 28 Conceived in an era when sales "on time"
were viewed as more appropriate for the purchase of luxuries than
necessities, the doctrine is based on the premise that a seller of goods
or services actually may have two prices at which he is willing to sell:
a cash price and a time price. Arguably, since he is free to set the
cash price, he is equally free to set the time price. Thus, the differential between the two freely-set prices is not interest, but a timeprice differential. Whatever its legal foundation, the time-price
doctrine has provided still another de facto exemption from the
usury laws.

I. Retail Instalment Sales
Retail instalment sales acts are of comparatively recent vintage;
they first appeared in the 1940's and spread rapidly throughout the
1950's. At present, thirty-five states regulate finance charges on the
instalment sale of motor vehicles, and about twenty-six restrict charges
on the sale of goods other than automobiles.29 The statutes, in terms,
27. Arizona, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia. See CURRAN 76-79.
28. See Berger, Usury in Instalment Sales, 2 LAw &: CONTEMP. PROB. 148-72 (1935);
Britton &: Ulrich, The Illinois Retail Instalment Sales Act-Historical Background and
Comparative Legislation, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 137, 143 (1958); Warren, Regulation of
Finance Charges in Retail Instalment Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839, 841-51 (1959).
29. CURRAN 83-84, 101-07, 256-77. To Miss Curran's compilation should be added
Georgia, Nebraska, and Texas (motor vehicles) and Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan,
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may apply only to motor vehicles, only to other goods, or to "all
goods."
Most retail instalment sales acts provide for rate ceilings that
decline as the amount of credit granted increases. This declining
ceiling is a product of several features. First, a number of statutes
provide for minimum charges, which, of course, raise the gross yield
on small transactions. Second, the majority of "all-good acts" specifically provide for a graduated rate ceiling, such as the New York
statute which provides for an add-on rate of $10 per $100 per year
on the first $500 of unpaid principal balance and $8 per $100 per
year on the balance in excess of $500.30 In addition, most "motor
vehicle acts" provide for a lower rate on newer cars, with the result
that instalment contracts written on older used cars, with low unpaid
balances, carry a higher rate than new car contracts. For example, in
New York the ceiling add-on rate on cars over two years old is $13
per $100 per year, while the add-on rate on a new car is $7 per $100
per year. 31 Thus if a New York consumer finances a $300 unpaid
balance on a refrigerator for one year, the highest legal finance charge
is $30 ($10 X 3 X 1), but the ceiling charge on the same unpaid
balance on a used car is $39 ($13 X 3 X 1). It may be seen, then,
that, depending on the item financed, the effective annual ceiling
rate may vary from 18% to 23%. Even greater variations can be found
in other states; seldom are rate ceilings in a given state the same for
motor vehicles and other goods.
2. Revolving Credit
The more recent origin of revolving retail credit plans probably
explains the relatively small number of states that limit finance
charges in this area.32 The most common rate permitted is 1.5% per
month on the unpaid balance, although various methods of determining the unpaid balance are allowed. The charge of 1.5% per
month is not equivalent to an annual rate of 18%, as one might suppose. 33 Some state laws provide for a graduated revolving credit rate,
so that larger balances carry lower rates.
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas (goods
other than motor vehicles).
30. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 404(1) (McKinney 1962).
31. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw § 303(1) (McKinney 1962).
32. Miss Curran lists eleven states which, under some denomination, refer to revolving credit in their more inclusive instalment vendor's acts, CURRAN 93 n.46.
33. Since the customer's pattern of purchases and payments will not typically fall
into a precise monthly cycle, it is apparent that he may be getting more or less than a
month's credit in return for the I½% charge. For a fuller exploration, see Jordan 8:
Warren 1306-07.
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C. General Conclusions
A few general conclusions may be drawn from this somewhat
sketchy review of existing rate ceilings. First, all of the ceilings discussed represent an exception to existing interest and usury laws,
except in those few states where no general usury statutes exist.
These exceptions are necessary to permit legitimate firms to provide
consumer instalment credit. Second, with some important exceptions,
rate ceilings decline as the amount of credit granted increases. Since
large amounts of credit are typically associated with long maturities,
it may be concluded that rate ceilings often vary inversely with both
the amount of credit and maturity of contract. Third, it should be
evident that when a consumer seeks to use a given dollar amount of
consumer instalment credit, he is subject to a wide variety of rate
ceilings, depending upon the applicable state law, his source of credit,
and, in some cases, the consumer good or service that he wishes to
acquire. In part, these variations have arisen because different types
of consumer credit were introduced at different times by various
types of credit grantors. If anything, the brevity of this review has
obscured the extent of the variety, or possibly chaos, of existing rate
ceilings. To develop sound legislation in this area we will need to
examine the purpose of rate ceilings and the economic principles
that should guide their design.
II.

PURPOSE OF

RATE

CEILINGS

Except in time of war, our economy is relatively free of price controls. Consumers bid with their dollars for various goods and services,
and resources are shifted to those industries producing the goods and
services desired by consumers. The interaction of free choice by consumers and free competition among suppliers meeting the expressed
desires of consumers sets the prices for the end products. Through
the price mechanism, goods and services are rationed among consumers and, if the markets are perfect, each consumer receives an
assortment of goods and services that is optimal from his point of
view within the constraints of his budget. Of course, it ~s recognized
that no market is perfect.34 We have relatively perfect competition
34, A perfectly competitive market must have all of the following characteristics:
(1) A commodity or service whose uniform type and quality ls recognized by
buyers and sellers;
(2) a large number of buyers and sellers, making offers to buy and sell independently;
(3) buyers and sellers who are fully informed as to prices; and
(4) buyers and sellers who are free to enter or to leave the market.
The perfect market is a limiting case found only in theory. Consequently, all
markets are imperfect to some extent. Discussions of the nature of competition in con•
sumer credit may be found in Dauer, The Nature of Competition in Consumer Credit,
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in the grain markets because of the existence of standard grades,
sophisticated buyers and sellers, and widely published prices. However, the market for most consumer goods and services is not characterized by standard grades and uniform prices. Suppliers often prefer
to rely on consumer brand preference and other forms of nonprice
competition, rather than to compete solely on the basis of price.
There is no reason why this should not be so. Consumers benefit
from product development and other forms of nonprice competition.
Our laws are designed, not to enforce price competition, but to encourage competition per se.
In spite of these imperfections, the rule accepted in most markets is caveat emptor. I£ a consumer pays $500 for a television set
that is "worth" only $300, there is no law, absent some proof of fraud,
that requires a refund of the difference or that levies a penalty on
the merchant. The individual consumer pays the penalty for his ignorance, carelessness, or greed. While particular consumers may
suffer, imposition of general price controls is shunned in the belief
that the general welfare would be damaged in the attempt to remedy
individual cases of bad judgment. This belief is well founded. If
price controls result in different prices than would have prevailed
in a freely competitive market, it follows that the resulting allocation of goods and services is suboptimal. While some individual consumers benefit, among consumers in general there is a net disadvantage because of the distortion of free choice by the imposed price
mechanism.
The imposition of rate ceilings on consumer credit is clearly a
form of price control. There are nvo possible economic rationales
for this governmental interference in an economic system that is
generally thought to operate most efficiently without price controls.
First, it may be thought that the consumer credit market is so imperfect that consumers seldom pay a "fair" price for their use of credit.
If this is so, the government may be obliged to define and enforce
prices that are "fair" to consumers. Second, within each given credit
market, suppliers of credit may have monopoly power, so that even
with perfect knowledge consumers may be overcharged for their use
of credit. If consumer credit is best dispensed through monopolies,
government should set prices that will both provide adequate service
to the consumer and a "fair" return to credit grantors, just as it at1958 PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT CONFERENCE 18-30; Phelps, Monopolistic
and Imperfect Competition in Consumer Loans, 8 J. OF MARKETING 382-93 (1944);
Yntema, The Market for Consumer Credit: A Case in Imperfect Competition, 196
ANNALS OF THE AM. ACADEMY OF POL,

8:

SOCIAL SCI.

79-85 (1938).
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tempts to do in the case of public utilities. Let us examine the economic rationale underlying these two objectives of price control in
consumer credit.

A. A "Fair' Price for Consumer Credit
The assertion that price controls are needed to counteract the
effects of an imperfect market must be based upon the following
premises:
I. There is a notable lack of knowledge on the part of consumers, coupled with an ability on the part of suppliers successfully
to differentiate their goods or services.
2. These imperfections cannot be mitigated significantly by providing more information to consumers.
3. Price controls will on balance improve the allocation of
goods and services sufficiently to overcome the misallocation of resources inherent in the design and enforcement of price ceilings.
I. An Imperfect Market

The market for consumer credit has often been characterized as
an imperfect market, because consumers do not have perfect knowledge about the credit services they acquire and because credit grantors differentiate their services.35 Several studies have shown that
consumers are not aware of the annual percentage rate that they
pay on various instalment credit transactions.36 However, the absence of specific knowledge of annual rates does not necessarily mean
that consumers are unaware that some sources of credit are less· expensive than others and that it is more costly to borrow small amounts
than large amounts. 37 In addition to lack of perfect knowledge by
consumers, imperfections may be attributed to differentiation among
credit grantors in such matters as credit terms, type of collateral
required, leniency of credit policy, collection policy, amount of
credit granted, and convenience and status of the credit grantor.
In spite of these forms of nonprice competition in the market for
consumer instalment credit, there is considerable evidence that finance charges are influenced by price competition, so that they are
forced below existing rate ceilings in many instances. Data provided
35. Phelps, supra note 34; Yntema, supra note 34.
36. F. JUSTER&: R. SHAY, CONSUMER SENSITIVITY TO FINANCE RATES: AN EMPIRICAL AND
ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION 47-75 (1964); W. l\IORS, CONSUMER CREDIT FINANCE CHARGES
80-91 (1965); Due, Consumer Knowledge of Instalment Credit Charges, 20 J. OF
MARKETING 162-66 (1955).
37. See testimony of George Katona in Hearings on S. 2755 Before a Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 806-07 (1960).
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the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
by two large sales finance companies on new-car contracts purchased
during November 1965, reveal that rates paid by consumers were
almost always below the rate ceiling, except in Michigan and Pennsylvania where rate ceilings were abnormally low. 38 Even in these
two states, where contract rates were most frequently at the ceiling,
we cannot be sure that lower finance rates were not offset in part by
slightly higher prices of the new car or lower values on trade-ins. An
earlier study of new-car finance rates shows that the rates in nonceiling states averaged 10.95% per annum, compared to an average
of 10.86% in all states, with some ceiling states having average rates
above the 10.95% average figure. 39
Other studies also indicate that competition operates as a fairly
effective check on finance charges for most types of consumer instalment credit.40 The major exception is cash loans made by consumer
finance companies. Except in one or two states, finance charges on
most short-term cash loans by licensed lenders appear to be at the
ceiling rates. 41 Actual finance charges on used cars are probably at the
ceiling more often than in the case of new cars, although there is no
reliable evidence to support this assertion. Since in both of these
particular markets, the consumer is frequently a marginal credit
38. The data may be more clearly shown in tabular form:
COMPARISON OF RATES CHARGED ON NEW-CAR CONTRACTS AND CEILING
RATES NOVEMBER 1965

Rate ceilings expressed as an add-on
charge per $100 of initial unpaid
balance
$6/SIOOa
$7 /$100b
$8/$IOOc
S9/$100d

Percentage of contracts in which consumers paid the ceiling rate,e
17.65
3.33
1.93
0.18

a Mich., Pa.
b Conn., Del., Kan., Me., Miss., Mo., Mont., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.D., Vt., "Wis.
c Ariz., Colo., Fla., Ind., Mass., Minn., N. M., Ore.
d Ky., Md., Neb.
e The method of calculation slightly overstates the percentage of contracts at
the ceiling rate, because it was assumed that where rates fell within a stated bracket,
all rates were at the top rate shown for the bracket.
Source: Confidential data representing over 20,000 contracts.
39. R. SHAY, NEW-AUTOMOBILE FINANCE RATES 1924-1962, 9-12 (1963).
40. Schweiger 8e McGee, Chicago Banking, 34 J. OF Bus. 203, 255-70 (1961). The
greatest amount of research in this area has been done by Allen F. Jung. See Jung,
Charges for Appliance and Automobile Instalment Credit in Major Cities, 35 J. OF
Bus. 386-91 (1962); Jung, Commercial Bank Charges in New York and Ontario, 3 NAT'L
BANKING REV. 397-408 (1965); Jung, Dealer Pricing Practices and Finance Charges for
New Mobile Homes, 36 J. OF Bus. 430 (1960); Jung, Terms on Home Improvement
Loans, 2 Nat'l Banking Rev. 51-60 (1964).
41. NATIONAL CONSUJIIER FINANCE Ass'N, THE CoNSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY 62-3 (1962).
Interviews with officers of major consumer finance companies indicate that in one or
two high ceiling states not all lenders charge the ceiling rates.
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risk, it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that the ceilings set
the rates. This is not to say that there is no competition when all
the consumer finance companies in a given state charge the same rate
on each size and maturity of loan, but that it must then center on
obtaining customers who qualify for that rate through various forms
of nonprice competition, such as prompt service and flexible terms.
2. Possible Improvements in Quality of Market
Consumer groups view failure to disclose the annual rate of finance charge as a key factor contributing to consumers' lack of
knowledge in the market. However, while advocating disclosure, they
have not coupled this proposal with a suggestion that rate ceilings
could then be removed. It seems apparent that a time-rate form of
disclosure of finance charges would probably reduce imperfections
in the market, although it would not provide the panacea which
seems to be anticipated by some consumer groups. Because time-rate
disclosure seems well on its way, the discussion here and in part III
relating to the design of rate ceilings is based on the assumption that
some form of time-rate disclosure will accompany the institution of
any rate ceiling.42 Additional improvement in the market should
follow from other suggested changes, designed to provide more complete information to consumers. For example, provisions for a fuller
disclosure of total finance charges or the total time price in advertising should assist consumers in shopping for credit. Finally,
various programs for the education of consumers offer potential for
the greatest long-run improvement in the market.
42. By inserting a new chapter 255D into the General Laws of Massachusetts in
1966, the Massachusetts legislature required disclosure of annual rate of charge in all
retail instalment sales agreements. The formula provided to calculate the annual
percentage rate increasingly overstates the actual rate as the maturity of contract
lengthens. Annual rates on irregular contracts are calculated on the pretense that
they are regular. See Driver, The New Massachusetts Retail Instalment Sales Act, 20
PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 110-14 (1966).
Department of Defense Directive No. 1344.7 of May 2, 1966, provides that banks
and credit unions with offices on military bases and other credit grantors wishing to
obtain collection assistance must disclose the "finance charges expressed in approximate
annual percentage rate." The conversion table accompanying the directive converts the
dollar finance charge, as defined in the directive, to a fairly close approximation of the
actuarial rate; that is, the rate determined by application of the "United States Rule,"
under which periodic payments are applied first to interest due with the remainder
going to the reduction of the principal. The problem of disclosing annual rates on
irregular contracts is met by .prohibiting irregular contracts.
These approaches to disclosure of finance charges developed after the Jordan &
,varren article, and present disclosure of the finance charge in terms of an annual
percentage rate, rather than in terms of dollars per $100 of initial unpaid balance per
year, as suggested by Jordan & Warren. The dollar add-on method of rate disclosure
is also provided in the current draft of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. Either
approach provides a common unit for measuring the time rate.
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3. Residual Imperfections

Even if the present market for consumer instalment credit is not
highly imperfect, and even if improvements can be made by such
means as providing for time-rate disclosure of the finance charge,
imperfections in the market will inevitably remain. These will result
from "irrational" behavior by consumers and from the continuance
of nonprice competition by suppliers of credit. The question posed,
then, is whether rate ceilings can eliminate or alleviate these imperfections, which are manifest in those cases in which consumers
pay "unfair" prices for credit.
The task of providing "fair" prices to all consumers should not be
underestimated. Assume that the regulatory authority wishes to produce a perfect market. Would all consumers then pay the same price
1
for a given dollar amount and maturity of credit? This is obviously
not the case. As noted above, credit service is not homogeneous. But
more important, all consumers are not the same either. Some have
excellent credit standing; others do not. Consequently, even if credit
services were somehow forced into a homogeneous mold, the rates
would have to vary among different consumers. If the government is
to interpose its judgment to counteract imperfections in the credit
market, it would thus theoretically be necessary not only to vary the
rates based on the type and duration of credit, but also to vary die
level of charge on each transaction depending on the individual
consumer's credit standing. Clearly, this would not be feasible.
As a practical matter, only one maximum charge can be specified
for the use of a given dollar amount of credit for a given period of
time, and it must apply without regard to other subsidiary services
provided or the credit standing of the consumer. Whatever rate is
set must therefore be "fair' to some consumers and "unfair" to
others. The consumers who benefit from the rate ceiling are those
who would otherwise have paid a higher rate through ignorance or
indifference, and whose credit standing is just sufficient to permit
them to obtain service at the ceiling rate. Other consumers are shut
out of the legal market, because their credit standing is not good
enough to enable them to obtain credit at the ceiling rate. As to a
third group of consumers, whose credit standing would be good
enough in a free market to obtain credit at well below the ceiling
rate, some may pay the ceiling rate, when such a rate is established,
because of lack of knowledge or skill in shopping. They will be paying a rate that is "unfair" in view of their credit standing, just as
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they will pay a price that is "unfair" if they do not shop carefully
for a new radio. Others in this third group will shop for their credit
and presumably obtain a "fair" rate which is below that set by the
ceiling; the ceiling as such has little direct effect here. Thus a uniform, universal ceiling protects only those consumers at the margin
who just "deserve" the rate set by the ceiling and who might otherwise have been charged a higher rate. Less credit-worthy consumers
are eliminated from the legal market; more credit-worthy consumers
are still exposed to the forces of an imperfect market.
The real question, then, is whether consumers who pay more
than they should for credit because of ignorance or indifference deserve some special protection. Since optimal rate ceilings cannot be
set for each separate transaction for each individual consumer, the
number of consumers that actually benefit from rate ceilings is considerably less than even the group that theoretically could benefit.
Moreover, for society as a whole, the economic cost of providing
protection from excessive charges may outweigh the gains achieved
by incompetent consumers. While the high costs of regulation and
the doubtfulness of the social benefits have generally been sufficient
to rule out the imposition of special price ceilings for most consumer
goods and services, it is unlikely that freedom from price control
would be politically acceptable in the field of consumer credit, in
view of the deep-seated emotions concerning usury and "consumer
protection."

B. A "Fair" Return to Credit Grantors
A second possible reason for advocating price controls arises
when the market is supplied by only one or a very few firms. Here,
even though a consumer might have perfect knowledge of the market, he will nonetheless be in an unfavorable bargaining position
relative to the supplier. In such cases, it has been the practice of the
government to limit the prices that may be charged, or to halt the
growth of monopoly power that would substantially lessen competition.
When the supply of legal cash credit was more restricted than
it is today, local credit monopolies were probably not uncommon.
With the broad variety of cash and vendor credit now available, however, there is little evidence of any substantial monopoly element
still existing in the consumer credit industry. A few states rigorously
restrict the entry of licensed lenders, so that there may be cases where
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marginal borrowers in a given market can find only one lender
willing to service them. 43 These instances must be infrequent, since
examination of the earnings of consumer finance companies does not
indicate the existence of monopoly profits that would follow from
the exercise of monopoly power. 44 The "remedial loan" to the
necessitous borrower has become increasingly uncommon, but there
are undoubtedly instances where lenders could and would exert
monopoly power to extort significantly higher finance charges than
permitted by existing rate ceilings. However, consumers facing this
threat still have the alternative of obtaining credit through vendors
or delaying their use of credit.
Some may view the fact that most consumer finance companies
charge the ceiling rate as evidence of monopoly power. However, as
has been noted elsewhere, "the fact that actual rates are at the ceiling
may be consistent either with monopolistic or competitive practices. "45 When all prices are at the ceiling in a competitive market,
there is good reason to believe that the ceiling simply has been set
below the equilibrium level. The imposed ceiling can and, in fact,
does hold down prices in the legal market. However, by artificially
limiting the supply in the legal market, the price ceiling is simultaneously creating an illegal market, where prices are not merely
at what would othenvise be the equilibrium level, but are higher in
order to cover the costs and risks of evasion of the law.
Even if there were convincing evidence of general monopoly
power, the task of regulating credit grantors as public utilities would
be every bit as complex as setting "fair" prices for consumers. Cost
structures vary materially from firm to firm within a particular
species of credit grantor and even more widely among different types
of credit grantors. Because of joint-cost problems, most non-specialized credit grantors find it very difficult to isolate costs attributable
to consumer credit. As in the case of public utility monopolies, rate
ceilings would have to be set for each individual credit grantor and
for each amount and maturity of credit. There would be a greater
variety of rate ceilings than now exists, and there would still be no
43. It should be kept in mind that markets for consumer credit are highly localized
on the demand side. A consumer living in Chicago does not seek credit in other cities.
Indeed, he may not view his credit market as encompassing more than a few square
miles. If he has a poor credit standing, his market is even more constricted.
44. Johnson, Conclusions for Regulation, in THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY: !TS
CosTs AND REcuLATION 142-43 (J. Chapman &: R. Shay eds. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
Chapman &: Shay].
45. Fand, Competition and Regulation in the Consumer Credit Markets, 20 PER•
SONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 23 (1965).
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assurance that consumers were paying a "fair" charge for their use
of credit.
In summary, the analysis suggests that the need for rate ceilings
lies more in the realm of philosophy and politics than in economics.
On the one hand, there are certainly cases where individual consumers are better off with rate ceilings than they would be without
them. There would undoubtedly be a higher incidence of unwary
consumers victimized by rapacious credit grantors in the absence of
rate ceilings. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that overall
social welfare is maximized by having rate ceilings. While regulation of prices may mitigate some problems, it introduces others. Any
regulation involves costs for the administrative apparatus and for
the regulated industry. The latter incurs added costs both in complying with the existing rules and in trying to influence future
changes in regulation. Regulation also tends to fragment the consumer credit industry, with a consequent reduction in competition
among different credit-granting institutions. Therefore, against the
benefits of rate ceilings to some consumers, we must weigh the costs
to others who may find distortions in their optimal consumption
patterns imposed by the ceilings and by the costs of regulation per se.
If, however, the rate ceiling is high enough, distortions in allocation of resources are minimized because the price mechanism can operate more freely and because less regulatory policing is required. Thus,
our aim should be to establish rate ceilings which are high enough
to allow the prices of most credit arrangements to be set by competition, but which will prevent those politically unpalatable and unconscionable transactions that represent the joining of an unwary
consumer with an avaricious or relatively powerful credit grantor.
Let us examine the basic economic principles for the formation of
rate ceilings, so that both consumers and credit grantors can meet
in a market unhampered by the existing hodge-podge of rate ceilings.
Ill.

DESIGN OF RATE CEILINGS

Formulation of sound price ceilings on any good or service is
difficult at best. Substitution of governmental fiat for the automatic
processes of the market place in the field of consumer credit is particularly formidable because of the multiplicity of variables encountered: the different types of credit grantors, the size and maturity
of credit, the associated credit services, and the credit standing of
each debtor. While perhaps the free market place has its own injustices, price ceilings are capable of creating even more. To minimize
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this type of injustice, it is essential that the objective be to set ceilings
rather than rates for all varieties of transactions. The purpose of this
section is to set forth certain basic principles that might guide the
design of general price ceilings on consumer credit in order to minimize distortions of the market and the consequent misallocation of
resources.
A. Uniformity of Ceiling
In formulating the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, a major
problem has been whether rate ceilings should vary by the type of
credit involved, the item financed, the type of credit grantor, and
from state to state. It was shown in Part I that this sort of variety is
characteristic of present rate ceilings. Given this problem, a discussion of the level and structure of rate ceilings will be more meaningful if we first determine whether it is appropriate to have one or
many rate ceilings.

I. Cash Credit Versus Vendor Credit
The hallowed time-price doctrine postulating a difference in
kind between cash and sales credit has somewhat greater economic
merit from the viewpoint of credit grantors than of consumers. Other
things being equal, if a cash loan is unsecured, the lender incurs
more risk, both because of his lack of security and because his
"money at risk" represents the entire loan. In contrast, the credit
vendor has at risk only his cash investment in the merchandise at
the time of sale. The vendor may even shift that risk to a third party
by selling his instalment paper to a financial institution. However,
a consumer receives essentially the same credit service whether he
finances his automobile through a dealer or directly with a bank.
In each instance he obtains an automobile, a given number of monthdollars of credit services, and an obligation to repay the debt.
There is one important economic difference between cash credit
and vendor credit that should influence the design of rate ceilings.
If legislation is properly drawn, the cash lender has no place to
conceal his finance charge and no source of additional income for
his credit services. In contrast, the vendor offering both a time price
and a cash price may juggle these prices any way he chooses.46 Thus,
46. This adjustment, however, is not made without cost either to the retailer or his
customers. The demand for credit is derived from the demand for goods and services
financed. Since the finance charge is a relatively small portion of the total time price
and monthly payment, consumers are probably not as sensitive to changes in the
price of credit as they are to changes in the cash price of the goods or services financed.
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if rate ceilings limit the permitted finance charge, the credit merchant can merely reallocate his actual total time price between the
cash price and finance charge. The point may be illustrated by an
extreme example. Complete prohibition of any finance charge undoubtedly would expel all rational legal cash lenders from the field
of consumer credit, but would not necessarily eliminate all vendor
credit. Some vendors would build the cost of credit into the cash
price of their merchandise and would offer "free" credit, just as many
credit jewelry, clothing, and furniture stores do now. At this extreme
the market would ultimately be segmented into retailers who sold
primarily for credit and those who sold primarily for cash, with the
price differential between merchants representing the buried finance
charge. Less punitive ceilings would permit retailers to continue to
offer both a cash price, as such, and a time price.
Low rate ceilings thus discriminate in favor of vendor credit
and against cash credit. They also discriminate in favor of credit
buyers in relation to cash buyers, because of the forced narrowing
of the time-price differential. While the lack of a significant economic distinction between cash credit and vendor credit suggests
that rate ceilings should be the same for each type of credit, the
ability of credit vendors to evade the full impact of a rate ceiling
makes it important to design ceilings that themselves do not discriminate against lenders in favor of vendors, or against cash buyers
in favor of credit buyers.

2. Closed-End Versus Open-End Credit
The distinction here is between instalment contracts-either
cash loans or time sales-and open-end arrangements, such as revolving credit, check credit, and charge-account banking. These
two basic forms of consumer credit differ significantly in the manner
in which credit is granted and serviced and in the procedures followed in assessing finance charges.47
From the standpoint of establishing rate ceilings, one basic disIn economic terminology, the demand for credit is probably less elastic than is the
demand for the good or service.
Assume that without rate ceilings a retailer has achieved his optimum market
strategy by allocation of the total time price between the cash price and finance charge.
An imposition of rate ceilings forces him to redistribute a portion of the finance charge
to the cash price. Because the demand for the good is more elastic than the demand for
credit, this shift will reduce the number of cash sales by an amount greater than any
resultant increase in credit sales. Thus, not only are total sales likely to be less, but
also the credit sales gained are more costly to service than the cash sales lost. The
resultant reduction in profits will force some marginal retailers out of the market.
47, See Jordan and Warren 1290-92.
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tinction is that in the case of closed-end credit the finance charge
can be determined at the inception of the contract on the assumption
that payments will be made on schedule. Rate ceilings can then be
set on the scheduled finance charge and upon penalties for late payments. In contrast, the finance charges on open-end credit can only
be determined after the debt has been incurred and after payments
have been made to reduce the debt. The debt load may vary from
day to day and remain outstanding over several years, as in the case
of revolving charge accounts at department stores.
It would be possible, conceptually, to limit finance charges on
open-end credit by requiring that after the debt has been retired,
the finance charges incurred be based on daily unpaid balances over
the period of indebtedness. Any amounts received in excess of a
specified annual rate would then be refunded. The practical difficulties of such an approach are evident. Further, if finance charges
are to be limited ex ante on both closed-end and open-end credit,
the specification of the rate ceilings must be consistent with each of
these two basically different methods of levying the finance charge.
A rate ceiling on closed-end credit may be stated in terms of a per
cent per month or year or as a dollar add-on rate. The rate ceiling
on open-end credit, however, must limit the percentage applicable
to monthly unpaid balances, as determined by trade practice or by
statute, and possibly provide a limited minimum charge per transaction (as in check credit) or per time period (as in revolving credit).
While this degree of segmentation of rate ceilings seems unavoidable, it does raise problems. Many credit grantors have a choice between offering closed-end or open-end credit. For example, a department store may sell a refrigerator on either an instalment contract or under its revolving credit plan. Similarly, a bank may offer
an instalment loan or the same amount of cash under a check-credit
plan. Obviously, the rate ceilings should be reasonably comparable
in order not to favor one type of credit over another. But this is
easier said than done. As pointed out by Jordan and Warren, 48 under
revolving credit plans the customer determines the actual rate that
he will pay, whereas the credit grantor establishes only the "rules
of the game" when he sets the monthly percentage and any minimum
charge. Consequently, actual rate ceilings under closed-end and
open-end credit will be identical only for hypothetical customers
and seldom for real ones.
On the other hand, there may be some merit in setting ceilings
48. Id.
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on open-end credit that on the average will be lower than rates for
similar amounts of closed-end credit. Jordan and Warren point out
that "it is not possible to make accurate time rate disclosure at the
inception of the transaction" on revolving charge accounts and checkcredit plans. 49 Consequently, it may be desirable to establish rate
ceilings on closed-end and open-end credit that do not encourage
credit grantors to employ open-end credit as a means of avoiding rate
disclosure.
3. Type of Credit Grantor
While existing rate ceilings are often based upon the type of
credit grantor, this distinction is of doubtful economic merit. Segmentation of rate ceilings on this basis permits credit grantors another means of product differentiation, thereby providing them
with some degree of monopoly power. Although each might charge
rates below their particular industry ceilings, credit grantors would
behave as non-competing groups within the protection of this market
segmentation.
Even if all credit grantors operated under the same rate ceiling,
there would be some segmentation of the market. Individual credit
grantors tend to charge the same rates for the same credit services to
all customers and do not attempt to vary rates according to the credit
standing of each applicant. Thus, commercial banks tend simply to
reject marginal risk borrowers and specialize in lending to better
credit risks. A uniform ceiling, however, would encourage credit
grantors to experiment with different rates of charge in order to
penetrate new markets and to adjust to changing economic conditions. This would reinforce the present trend toward diversification, discourage customer segmentation, and bring increased competition into the field as a whole.
One possible exception to a uniform ceiling applicable to all
credit grantors should be noted. If one group of cash lenders is
singled out elsewhere in legislation for licensing requirements and
other detailed regulations designed to protect a special, marginal
risk class of consumers, these lenders should be given an augmented
rate. This rate should be high enough to cover the added costs of
regulation and the increased costs associated with managing a more
risky portfolio of loans.
Although some consumer representatives express the fear that a
uniform rate ceiling would encourage all types of credit grantors
49. Id. at 1305.
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to raise their rates to the ceiling, the evidence presented in part n° 0
suggests that competitive pressure would tend to keep rates below
a properly-designed ceiling. Indeed, even without some form of rate
disclosure, in most types of credit, actual ra,tes are held significantly
below the ceiling by competition. The major exceptions have been
revolving credit, where the rate ceilings are largely set in terms of
what is in fact the going rate, and small loans by licensed lenders.
In the latter case, competition focuses on assuming credit risks up
to the margin, given the ceiling rate fixed by statute. With the advent of rate disclosure, price competition is likely to be even more
prevalent.

4. Type of Item Financed
It was observed in Part I that a· further segmentation of the
market is produced by rate ceilings that are related to the type of
item financed. Thus the rate ceiling applicable to a $600 used car
under a motor vehicle act is likely to differ from the rate ceiling
on the credit sale of a $600 color television set under an all goods
act. A case might be made for differences in rates among types of
merchandise, and rates do differ in the free market. For instance,
other things being equal, it is more risky to finance the sale of a television set than a used car. In case repossession is necessary, there is
a fairly active market in used cars, but not in used home furnishings,
It seems unlikely that any form of rate ceiling can properly take
into account these subtle distinctions, even for existing products and
services, let alone for yet undeveloped goods and services. Rather
than attempt to do so, it would seem more workable to establish a
uniform rate applicable to all goods, permitting each credit grantor
to assess those subtle risks inherent in the goods or service financed
and adjust his willingness to provide credit accordingly. In any
case, the potential risk of granting credit to the particular consumer
and the margin between costs and rate ceiling are likely to weigh
far more heavily in the ultimate credit decision than the characteristics of the good purchased. For these reasons it seems economically unsound to base rate ceilings on the type of item financed, so
long as we assume that we are setting ceilings and not rates.

5. State of Jurisdiction
At the present time, as we have seen, there are substantial differences in rate ceilings among the states. Just how great is the
50. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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economic impact of these differences, however, cannot be assessed
without examining other aspects of the statutes that affect the costs
of providing credit and possible additional sources of :finance income.
For example, in addition to variations in rate ceilings, there are
marked diversities among the states in the amounts of credit that
may be granted by different lenders, restrictions on freedom of entry,
debtors' and creditors' remedies, and provisions relating to creditassociated insurance. Though the interaction of these provisions is
difficult to measure, the net effect is a further segmentation of the
credit market. The result is that credit capital flows from states with
low margins between rate ceilings and costs to more generous states.
There are economic reasons for supporting different rate ceilings
among the states, although there is no sound evidence to suggest that
existing variations are founded on such economic reasoning. The
credit standing of consumers does vary widely among the states. As
one indication of credit standing, only 12% of families in the Northeast and West had money incomes of less than $3,000 in 1965, compared to 25% of the families in the South. 51 If money income is a
suitable proxy for credit standing, a national uniform rate ceiling
would make cash credit available to a smaller portion of families in
Southern states than in other regions. Vendor credit would be less
affected for the reasons stated earlier in this section. 52
An attempt to set rate ceilings in relation to the credit standings
of consumers in various states, however, would face a number of
problems. In the :first place, the demographic differences among the
many markets within a single state may be as great as those among
states. Markets for consumer credit are not defined by state boundaries, but are much more narrowly limited geographically. In some
areas, especially in large cities, consumers may not range more than
a few blocks in shopping for credit. For example, the variations in
characteristics of consumers between the Michigan cities of Ishpeming and Detroit and among the various credit markets within
Detroit are so great that any state-wide ceiling must represent a
substantial compromise between the needs of high-cost and low-cost
markets. A uniform ceiling among the several states merely presents
the same problem, although possibly in magnified form. Certainly.it would be easier to establish general ceilings than to set separate
rates to reflect the economic characteristics of the myriad markets
for consumer credit.
51. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CONSUMER INCOME 4 (Series P-60, No. 51, 1967).
52. See text accompanying note 46 supra.

104

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:81

In addition, it should be recognized that any uniform rate ceiling
-either state-wide or nation-wide-will leave pockets of high-risk
consumers that will not be provided credit at the ceiling rate, and
there will be more pockets in some cities and states than in others.
A rate ceiling high enough to encompass these high-risk areas would
probably not be tolerated by the public conscience. Moreover, the
scarcity of cash credit in these pockets of poverty reflects much more
fundamental economic and social problems than those associated
with consumer credit. Rather than distort rate ceilings, it would be
more appropriate to deal with these problems directly. In these
circumstances if cash credit is to be provided under "reasonable"
rate ceilings, it must be supported by some form of subsidy.u3
B. Definition of Finance Charge
The definition of "finance charge" is pertinent both to the disclosure of the charge to consumers and to the determination of the
level of the ceiling. There is no intrinsic reason why the definition
should be the same for each purpose, although regulation is likely
to be easier if the definitions are identical. It should be clear that a
proper definition of the finance charge is crucial-a faulty definition
may facilitate evasion of the rate ceiling or unduly restrict the credit
market. Because of the scope of the problem we can only sketch its
broad outlines here.
Definition of the finance charge is fairly simple if one is willing
to adopt the approach used by the Russell Sage Foundation expressed
in the first Uniform Small Loan Law: given the principal amount
of credit extended to a consumer, everything else that he agreed to
repay over and above this amount, however expressed or labelled,
was defined as the "finance charge" (although mislabelled "interest"
in the first draft). The rigor of this early definition reflects an attempt
to combat the loan sharks of that era, who had devised numerous
methods of obtaining exorbitant rates by levying additional charges
while complying in terms with the usury statutes. 04
The principle of such an all-inclusive charge, however, became
less applicable as new forms of consumer credit were developed and
new credit-associated services were provided. The growth of instalment sales financing brought various forms of property insurance
covering the goods sold, and there was general agreement that the
53. With the aid and financial support of the Office of Economic Opportunity,
some credit unions have been established in poverty areas to provide cash credit to the
poor.
54. See Nugent, The Loan Shark Problem, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3-13 (1941).
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premiums, although paid by the borrower, were not part of the finance charge. More varied treatment was accorded filing fees and
charges for the release of liens. Provision of life, accident, and health
insurance for the debtor brought on a heated controversy as to
whether the premiums on these policies were part of the finance
charge or merely a charge for additional benefits received. 55
Whatever the definition of the finance charge, it is apparent that
the more all-inclusive the definition, the higher must be the rate
ceiling in order to accommodate the same group of consumers. There
is probably considerable merit to excluding insurance premiums
from the definition, if for no other reason than to relegate that
complex area of supervision to state insurance commissioners. Insurance premiums must be adjusted frequently as loss experience
changes, and this would necessitate a change in rate ceilings if the
cost of insurance premiums were included in the definition of the
finance charge. As we shall see in the next two sections, regulation
of those charges commonly defined as part of the finance charge is
difficult enough.
C. Level of Finance Charge
In those rare instances in our economy when price controls appear to be justified, there is a great temptation to assume that since
price ceilings are needed to protect consumers, even greater protection can be achieved by further lowering the ceilings. This is a gross
misconception.
To explore the effects of price control more fully, let us leave
the emotionally-charged field of consumer credit and assume that
it is thought desirable to limit the prices charged by the more mundane taxi industry. If licensees are free to enter and leave the busi55. For representative literature see Cade, The Fundamental Issues of Consumer
Credit Insurance, 1955 INS. LAW J. 76-93; Credit Life Insurance: Pro and Con, 1956
PROCEEDINGS OF THIRD ANNUAL CONSUMER CREDIT CONFERENCE; Dunbar, Credit Insurance Use by Licensed Lenders, 1956 INS. LAW J. 443-58; Mors, Consumer Installment
Credit Insurance, 1956 INs. LAw J. 299-318.
It might be noted that the Department of Defense Directive 373-66 of May 2, 1966,
relating to the personal commercial affairs of military personnel defines in its disclosure section as finance charges those "which benefit the seller or creditor, or
entities in which either has an interest. These are charges which woulcl not be made if
this were a cash purchase:
a. Official fees for filing or recording credit instrument.
b. Charges for investigating credit worthiness of borrower.
c. Insurance premiums (life, disability, accident, health, other).
d. All other charges for extending credit."
This definition represents substantially a return to the early all-inclusive definition of
the finance charge, perhaps reflecting the suspicion that servicemen remain particularly
susceptible to loan sharks.
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ness, the rate ceiling will determine not only the price on the meter
but also the level of taxi services provided consumers. A high rate
will attract operators into the business; a low rate will discourage
entry. If the Taxi Commissioner should seek to "protect" consumers
by lowering the rate ceiling to ten cents a mile, he would probably
drive most of the operators out of the business. To obtain taxi service
consumers would be forced to deal with unlicensed taxis, or "gypsies"
as they are sometimes called. Here, the rates would be whatever the
market would bear, and consumers would be unprotected by insurance, more stringent driving tests, and other responsibilities required of licensed taxi drivers.
Moreover, in establishing the rate ceiling, the Commissioner
would also have to be concerned about the level of rates in relation
to distance traveled. Thus price control places with the price setter
the responsibility of establishing a variety of rate ceilings that are
high enough to provide an "adequate" level of service and are so
related to the services performed that no particular type of service is
unduly priced out of the market. In essence, he is trying to reproduce
the prices that would result in a perfectly competitive market. If the
Taxi Commissioner is not uneasy in his role of playing God over
the price system, he should be.
The legislator who places price ceilings on consumer instalment
credit is faced with essentially the same type of problem. Both the
level and the slope of the rate ceiling in relation to size and maturity
of credit will have important economic effects upon consumers and
upon credit grantors as well.

I. Effect Upon Consumers
It is very common for legislators to ask for a full disclosure and
analysis of credit grantors' costs of doing business in order that they
may set appropriate rate ceilings. Unfortunately, this approach puts
the cart before the horse. If capital is free to move from one industry
to another and across state lines, a ceiling on rates determines the
level of allowable costs, which in tum sets the permitted level of
service. In other words, given a rate ceiling, a credit grantor must
adjust his operations to generate sufficient profit on owners' equity.
Higher rate ceilings permit those credit grantors lending at the margin to assume greater risks, or, in other words, to incur the higher
costs necessarily involved in serving more marginal customers. Lowering of ceilings drives marginal customers from the market, and
they either forego their use of credit or tum to illegal lenders. In
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this manner rate ceilings determine which consumers will be served
by the legitimate market. Consequently, the real question to ask
in a rate hearing is what proportion of the state's consumers do we
wish to have served by legal credit granters operating under the protective provisions of the statute. It should be remembered that
changes in rate ceilings leave relatively undisturbed those credit
granters and consumers doing business at below-ceiling rates. Just as
a change in the minimum wage laws directly affects only those
workers receiving the minimum, so does a change in rate ceilings
directly affect only those borrowers operating at the ceiling. 56
Evidence to support the foregoing analysis of the economic effect
of rate ceilings can best be derived from the consumer finance industry. Because licensed lenders are dealing with high-risk borrowers, their rates are generally at the ceiling. In addition, unlike
the credit vendor, they find it difficult to offset the effect of lower
ceilings by reallocation of the finance charge to the price of the goods
and services. Consequently, the small loan or consumer finance industry provides the clearest illustration of the effect of price ceilings
on the size of market that can be served. In a recent study of this
industry, there is considerable evidence supporting the theory that
costs follow rate ceilings .. Analysis of the operating statements of
forty-eight companies, located in different states, shows a very close
correlation between gross income (that is, annual yield from credit
granted) and operating costs: "[w]hen gross income per $100 of loans
outstanding is high, operating costs per $100 of loans are high, and
vice versa." 57 The higher operating costs that follow the higher
ceilings implicit in the higher percentage yield appear directly attributable to an assumption of higher risks. Given freedom of entry
and freedom to compete, consumer finance companies react to higher
ceilings by turning down a smaller proportion of applicants and
serving a larger proportion of the population. Serving more marginal customers means that companies in states with higher or more
lenient ceilings incur greater operating costs for investigation and
collection, as well as a higher net charge-off of bad debts. But consumer finance companies in these states do not show any apparent
improvement in profits. 58 Thus costs tend to follow rate ceilings be56. Note also that such a rate ceiling change has a more direct and substantial
effect on lenders, because vendors have the opportunity of transferring part of the
finance charge to the cash price of goods and services if the rate ceiling is lowered.
See text accompanying note 44 supra.
57. Zwick, A Cross-Section Study of Industry Costs and Earnings in Chapman &:
Shay 71.
58. Shay, State Regulation and the Provision of Small Loans in Chapman &: Shay,
104; Zwick, A Cross-Section Study of Industry Costs and Earnings in Chapman &: Shay
77.
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cause credit grantors operating within high ceilings undertake more
risky portfolios. 09
Even if we have a reasonable concept of the size of the market
that should be served by legitimate credit grantors, it is difficult to
measure the adequacy of existing services, just as it is difficult to
evaluate the sufficiency of taxi service. The size of the legal market
may be judged in part by studying the amount of consumer instalment credit outstanding per person. The extent of the illegal market
is obviously even more hazardous to measure. Reports of activities
of "goon squads" and "juice men" dealing with consumers might
lead one to suspect that some rate ceilings are so low that a large
enough market of poor credit risks has been created to warrant the
activities of illegal lenders.
In summary, it is not possible to say precisely that a particular
rate ceiling is too high or too low. Once we have decided that we wish
to have rate ceilings, we have also implicitly decided to segment
the market into "haves" and "have nots." We admit some consumers
to the market and hope that each will shop for the best credit buy
available. Others with a lower credit standing are denied entry to
the legal market and to the other protections afforded by the legislation. Clearly, we hope that they will postpone satisfying their needs
until their credit standing is sufficient to gain entry. But we should
not be surprised if some turn to the "gypsies" of the credit industry.
Since credit grantors must maintain an adequate margin between
revenues and costs to attract capital, it should be apparent that the
level of credit service is as much affected by statutory provisions affecting costs as by those setting rate ceilings. For example, there is
good reason to argue that consumers may need more protection "in
the area of creditors' remedies and effective policing by public officials .... " 60 However, to the extent that these added safeguards result in significantly higher costs to credit grantors, rate ceilings may
have to be raised to avoid pinching off the supply of credit. Because
of this intimate relationship between rate ceilings and costs, it should
be apparent that the different sections of a comprehensive statute,
such as the proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code, are similarly
interrelated. Thus it would be difficult to make significant changes
in any one section without creating a need to amend several other
sections.
59. For added support, see GoUDZWAARI>, THE EFFECT OF RATE STRUCTURE UPON nm
OF CREDIT AT CONSUMER FINANCE COMPANIES (Unpublished Ph.D. Disserta•
tion, Michigan State University 1965).
60. Jordan 8: Warren 1322.
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Because a high proportion of the costs of granting credit are for
services performed, rather than for the mere use of money, the costs
of these services are likely to rise with general increases in wage rates
and price levels. Consequently, a rate ceiling that is appropriate for
one year may become quite inappropriate for later years. Given fixed
rate ceilings, a prolonged rise in operating costs will progressively
squeeze more and more consumers from the legal market as the credit
grantors seek to maintain their profit margin by eliminating high risk
borrowers. If rate ceilings are to be uniform among the states, it
appears desirable, therefore, to allow for a partial increase in rate
ceilings in relation to some price index. Such an automatic adjustment appears preferable to leaving the changes to the vagaries of fifty
different state legislatures.

2. Effect on Industry Structure
One general result of rate ceilings is to limit the ability of the
particular restricted credit industry to compete for capital against
those other types of credit grantors who may not face such ceilings.
This effect was particularly evident in 1966, when the savings and
loan associations and other mortgage lenders in some states found it
difficult to compete for funds to invest in mortgages whose yields
were unduly restricted by usury laws.
In addition to this inter-industry effect of rate ceilings, there are
important intra-industry effects. Lower rate ceilings force both marginal customers and marginal credit grantors from the market. This
is particularly so in the case of cash lenders. As the rate ceiling presses
down, the market ultimately becomes too restricted for economical
operation, and some cash lenders must leave the market. 61 The recent
study of the consumer finance industry shows that the small companies have lower net operating income ratios and notably higher
costs of financing. Not only do they pay more for what they borrow,
but they cannot borrow as much in relation to their net worth as
their larger competitors.62 Consequently, low rate ceilings probably
force out the small lenders and bring a greater concentration of the
61. This has happened. See Nugent, Three Experiments With Small-Loan Interest
Rates, 12 HARV. Bus. REv. 35-46 (1933). In three states, at different times the legislatures
reduced the rate ceilings permitted licensed lenders in response to public allegations
that rates were too high. 'When the market was so restricted that legitimate lenders
could not operate at a profit, they withdrew their capital from the state. Illegal
lenders flocked in and were only driven out when new legislation providing higher
rates was passed. See also Birkhead, Murray & Lockmoeller, Illegal Lending in Missouri,
16 Mo. L. REV. 251-73 (1951).
62. Shay, supra note 58, at 114-18.
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industry in the hands of the large cash lenders. Since large companies
tend to make relatively more large loans, such concentration would
also be likely to reduce somewhat those services available to borrowers of small amounts.
D. Slope of Rate Ceiling

It was noted in Part I that a number of existing statutes provide
for rate ceilings that decline as the amount of credit increases. 63 Since
large grants of credit are ordinarily accompanied by long maturities,
it is also generally true that ceiling rates decline as maturities
lengthen. The question is whether this is an appropriate design for
an overall rate ceiling, or whether the ceiling should be level for all
sizes of debt, as in the case of the rate ceiling on loans by credit
unions.
There is good reason to believe that credit grantors' operating
costs do not rise in proportion to the amount of credit extended. The
initial cost of granting credit is typically quite large in relation to
other costs of handling the contract once it is on the books. To illustrate, a recent comprehensive survey of operating data of 171 commercial banks shows an average acquisition cost per loan of $17.47,
compared with an average monthly processing cost per payment of
$.96. 64 I£ one allows a return of 14% before taxes for cost of capital
funds, these data suggest a required annual rate of about 90% on
a $100 loan for six months, compared to a required rate of not quite
18% on a loan of $1,000 for twenty-four months. 65 This cost structure
63. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
64. FUNCTIONAL COST ANALYSIS 171 BANK COMPARATIVE STUDY DEPOSITS UP TO $50
MILLION 1964-1965, A-11. The study, undertaken by the respective Federal Reserve
Banks, covers banks in the Boston, New York and Philadelphia districts.
65. Consider first a loan for $100 for six months. To process the loan application,
to investigate the credit standing of the consumer, and to set up the loan on the books
costs the bank about $17.47-the acquisition cost. Each monthly collection costs the
bank $0.96, or $5.76 for the six monthly payments. The acquisition cost and the
monthly collection cost sum to $23.23, which may then be converted, on an annual
basis, to a ratio of cost against declining unpaid balance. This annual rate, then,
represents the yield which the lender must receive to cover these costs alone. A very
accurate estimate of the "true" or actuarial annual rate, calculated according to the
"United States Rule" [Story v. Livingston, 38 U.S. 359 (1839)], can be obtained by the
direct ratio formula:
6mD
Yield=-------3P(n 1) D(n - 1)
in which m = the number of payments per year (if payments are monthly, m is always
12); D = the dollar finance charge; P = principal amount of credit granted; n =
number of payments required by the contract. Inserting the cost data in the formula,
we have
6 X 12 X 23.23
Y i e l d = - - - - - - - - - - .7547, or 75.5%
3 X 100(6 1) 23.23(6 - 1)

+ +

+ +
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suggests that as the size of credit increases, total costs per $100 of
credit granted decline at a decreasing rate and eventually level off.
Empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. The consumer finance study shows that operating costs as a percentage of loans outstanding were lower by an average of $1.26 for each $100 increase in
average loan balance. 66 A review of the 1964 annual reports of state
supervisors indicates that operating expense ratios per $100 of
average loan balance outstanding ranged from 32.8% on an average
balance of $131 to 16.2% on $400 and 11 % on $588. 67 Given the
similarity between their basic operating costs, there is no reason to
expect a significant difference in the general nature of other credit
grantors' costs.
It was argued in the previous section that since costs follow
ceilings, it is inappropriate to base the level of rate ceilings upon
some calculation of costs. Why then is the structure of costs significant to establishing a slope in the rate ceiling? Indeed, why not have
a rate ceiling that is constant, regardless of the amount of credit
granted? The answer lies in the fact that if the rate ceiling is high
enough to provide an adequate level of credit service for small
amounts of credit, a non-sloping ceiling would permit rates on large
amounts of credit considerably in excess of the rate required to elicit
a similar level of service for those amounts. For example, the annual
rate of 36% might be thought "appropriate" (though probably inadequate) to finance a thirty dollar radio for ten weeks, but would be
more than enough to cover the costs of making most cash loans of
$2,000. Even if time-rate disclosure and rate competition would drive
the rates actually charged well below 36% on large extensions of
credit, the political problems of attempting to support and pass a
rate ceiling of 36% for large amounts of credit would be staggering.
So long as rate ceilings are viewed as a necessity, their design should
This figure represents only the operating costs expressed as an annual percentage
of the monthly declining unpaid balance on the loan. Nothing is yet allowed for
interest on the money at work, corporate income taxes, or return on the owners' equity.
An estimate of this "cost of capital" of 14% before taxes is probably a bit high for
commercial banks and too low for other credit grantors assuming a higher risk. In any
event, by adding the 75.5% operating cost requirement and the 14% capital cost re•
quirement, we obtain a required rate of return on the $100, six-month loan of 89.5%
-the minimum annual yield necessary to cover operating costs, taxes and a return on
the funds at use.
By similar calculations it may be shown that the operating-cost rate for a $1000,
twenty-four-month loan is about 3.8%. With the cost of capital funds added, the total
required yield is 17.8%.
66. See Shay, supra note 58, at 100-01; Zwick, supra note 58, at 64.
67. Since these ratios exclude cost of capital, they understate the total costs of
providing credit.
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rest both on economic principles and political realities. Consequently,
given the demand for ceilings, a rate ceiling that slopes downward
with size of credit extension and levels off at some point has economic
merit, as well as being a political necessity.
The acuteness of the problem of designing an appropriate slope
to the rate ceiling depends in large part upon the overall level of the
ceiling. There are two distortions in the credit market that may be
brought about by an inappropriate slope if the overall ceiling is low.
On the one hand, if the slope is too steep, so that rates permitted on
small amounts of credit are quite high in relation to those permitted
on large amounts, credit grantors will favor small extensions of credit.
An excellent example of this result is afforded in a study by the
Royal Commission on Banking and Finance in Canada: 68
[I]t is striking that a very low proportion of loans is made in the
$1,000 to $1,500 range. This is not because there is little demand
for loans over $1,000-about one-quarter of all cash lending is in
amounts over $1,500-but because the companies find the ½ of I
per cent a month maximum rate allowed on balances in the $1,000
to $1,500 range barely covers their cost of funds and in fact involves
them in losses after administrative and bad debt expenses.
Another disadvantage of a too-steeply sloped ceiling is that it encourages credit grantors to fractionalize their grants of credit. Thus
a consumer who wishes to borrow $900 might be forced to obtain
three loans for $300, so that lenders can obtain an adequate overall
rate. On the other hand, if the slope is too gradual, the rates provided
for small amounts of credit may be so low as to pinch off loans
under some dollar amount. For example, Maryland has a ceiling on
size of loan from licensed lenders of $300 and a flat maximum rate
of three per cent per month. As a result, about three-fourths of the
dollar volume of loans made by licensed lenders are in the range from
$200 to $300, while virtually none are made below seventy-five dollars.
In contrast, licensed lenders in Alabama, operating under a more
steeply sloped rate ceiling, make about one-fourth of the dollar
volume of their loans for seventy-five dollars or less.69
In short, we are confronted with the same problem faced by regulators of taxi fares. An initial charge is made when the customer
enters the cab. The longer the trip, the more the charge is spread out
over the miles covered, so that the rate per mile gradually declines
and then levels off. The larger the initial, or "acquisition charge,"
the higher the return on short trips. If this charge is insufficient,
68. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION
69. See Shay, supra note 58, at 94.

ON BANKING AND FINANCE

209 (1964).
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drivers will avoid short trips, as anybody who has attempted to take
a cab from one terminal to another at the Kennedy Airport can
attest. If the initial charge is too high, drivers will avoid long trips.
In formulating rate ceilings that decline with the amount of credit
granted, our objective must be to provide about the same amount of
credit service in each category that would have been available in a
free market, while at the same time cutting off unconscionable transactions. No scientific formula can be devised to determine the proper
slope. Costs of granting credit vary among credit grantors, because
they provide credit in varying amounts and maturities. Many, such
as retailers and banks, provide additional goods and services, and the
costs of providing these items are often shared with the consumer
credit department. The variations among credit grantors and the
many instances of joint costs are major barriers to the scientific design of rate ceilings. The dangers inherent in designing a sloped rate
ceiling provide one more justification for having "loose" ceilings and
encouraging competition to set rates below the ceiling.
IV.

SUMMARY

Existing rate ceilings on consumer credit transactions vary widely
between cash credit and vendor credit, between closed and open-end
credit, by type of credit grantors, by type of item financed, and by
state of jurisdiction. Ceilings on cash credit were established to legalize transactions that could not have been accommodated under most
usury laws. Rate ceilings on credit sales are of more recent vintage.
In part they were a response to greater concern about consumers and
their use of credit; in part they reflect credit grantors' fears that the
time-price doctrine may not provide a sufficient shield against the
charge of usury.
The alleged purpose of rate ceilings has been to achieve a "fair"
price to consumers, or a "fair" return to credit grantors. But the great
variations among consumers and credit grantors force us to rely upon
the effectiveness of shopping by consumers and competition among
credit grantors to attain a price that is fair to both parties. The best
that rate ceilings can do is to nip the unconscionable transactions
which result from a joining of an unwary or desperate consumer and
an avaricious credit grantor. The worst that rate ceilings can do is
to distort the market for legal credit, so that consumers are thrust
into the hands of illegal lenders.
While rate competition appears to be reasonably effective in
many types of consumer credit, it would probably be improved to
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some extent by a rate form of disclosure, especially in transactions
involving an appreciable dollar amount, where comparison shopping
is likely to occur. In addition, greater competition among credit
grantors would be fostered by breaking down the market segmentations created by present rate ceilings and other regulations. With
some possible exceptions, the same general ceiling should apply to
cash and vendor credit, to all types of credit grantors, and to all
items financed. It may be desirable to provide higher rates in states
with very low income levels, although the merits of this rest more on
questions of social values than economics. It does appear necessary
to set ceilings for closed-end and open-end credit that reflect the
different methods of calculating finance charges in these two fields.
To mitigate distortions of the credit market and to allow for the
infinite variety of credit transactions we must set ceilings, rather than
rates, and then rely on competition to establish rates charged that
are generally below the ceiling. Inflationary increases in operating
costs of credit grantors should be reflected in automatic adjustments
to the rate ceilings. A rate ceiling that slopes downward in relation
to size of credit granted is appropriate. The less oppressive the
ceiling, the less significant is the precise definition of the slope.
If the formulation of rate ceilings on consumer credit appears to
be a complex and uncertain task, this analysis will have served its
purpose. Substitution of governmental fiat for the free operation of
the market in making price determinations is never easy.

